Middle East Monitor June 2011 – Wikistrat - nb Is this a balanced summing up? Let me Know please @harlechnnorfolk

Summary

The biggest strategic development in June was the change in relations between Turkey and Syria, and therefore, Iran. The increasingly strong relationship between Turkey, Iran and Syria was of great concern to the West and especially, Israel. The Turkish government is now condemning the violence of the Syrian regime towards its people, with officials even talking of creating a “buffer zone” along the border to protect refugees. The Turkish demands for the creation of a multiparty democracy in Syria will never be accepted by President Bashar Assad, and therefore, it is difficult to see how relations can soon be repaired. This deterioration in relations is a very significant change in alignment of power in the region and works to the advantage of the West.

On June 30, the U.N. Special Tribunal on Lebanon indicted four Hezbollah officials in the assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri in 2005. Only one, Mustafa Badreddine, had a senior position. This is a development long feared by Hezbollah and its state sponsors, who have attribute the assassination to Israel. Fear over the tribunal was the biggest reason for Hezbollah’s collapse of, and subsequent takeover of, the Lebanese government. Moving into July, Lebanon enters a major political crisis with regional ramifications. Syria and Iran are also under increasing international pressure for their human rights abuses and nuclear programs.

Another important development was the departure of Yemeni President Saleh to Saudi Arabia for medical treatment following a dramatic assassination attempt that also wounded several other top officials. The protest movement is determined to prevent his return. Government officials have insisted that he would soon return, but this has not happened. Recently, the Yemeni Vice President said it was possible that his injuries would prevent his return.

In Libya, the rebels have finally gained an edge over forces loyal to the Qaddafi regime. The war has not yet decisively shifted in their favor, but they are now gaining ground in the western mountains. France has also delivered arms to the rebels, marking an important escalation of foreign involvement. The stalemate has been broken, but there is no sign that the pro-Qaddafi forces are on the verge of collapse, allowing a quick end to the war. Once it appears to these forces that defeat is inevitable, that could quickly change.

 

Wikistrat Bottom Lines

Opportunities

• The indictments of Hezbollah officials in the Hariri assassination strikes at the terrorist group’s legitimacy. Its assassination of a political opponent exposes it as a foreign proxy and a terrorist group not strictly concerned with defending Lebanon against Israel. The indictments, along with Hezbollah’s continued backing of the Syrian President despite his regime’s gross human rights abuses, threaten to do serious harm to the group’s popular support.
• President Saleh’s stay in Saudi Arabia for medical treatment puts him in an extraordinarily vulnerable position. He can be forced to keep out of Yemen, and is now acutely aware of the threat posed to his life.
• Turkey’s confrontation with Syria dramatically increases the pressure on the Assad regime, and presents an opening for the West to cooperate with Turkey in challenging enemies in the region.
• The Libyan rebels are making progress in their war against the Qaddafi regime, yet remain extremely dependent upon Western support. This dependency can be utilized to influence the composition and behavior of the rebel forces and address concerns about the Islamist forces among them.

Risks

• Prime Minister Erdogan and his political party are Islamists, and Turkish-Israeli relations have sharply deteriorated under his leadership. It is very possible that the Turkish government will support the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood over other secular opposition elements.
• Al-Qaeda is benefiting from the instability in Yemen, and is battling Yemeni forces as the terrorist group tries to expand its control of territory. The power vacuum that currently exists benefits Islamist elements such as Al-Qaeda, the Iranian-supported Houthi rebels, and the Muslim Brotherhood affiliate, Islah, which is the dominant opposition party.
• The Syrian and Iranian regimes often engage in provocations against Israel in times of domestic troubles, with the Nakba Day incidents being the latest example. Their proxies, especially Hezbollah, will likely seek to confront Israel as the regimes seek to cope with rising domestic and international pressure.

Dependencies

• The degree to which Turkey seeks to promote certain factions within the Syrian opposition. An effort to boost the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood will strain relations with the West, and reduce Western support for a policy of regime change in Syria.
• The insistence of Yemeni President Saleh to return home despite his injuries. The willingness of the Saudis to forcibly keep him in their country is also a key factor, as the Gulf Cooperation Council and the U.S. have been working to convince him to give up power.
• The amount of pressure it will take for Qaddafi’s forces to feel they are engaged in a losing fight, and whether they believe a post-Qaddafi Libya will be welcoming towards them.

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Country Focus

Bahrain

• Status- There is no reason to believe that opposition to the Royal Family has subsided, but the crackdown by the regime with the assistance of Saudi and Emirati forces has worked thus far. The Royal Family does not face a major organized challenge on the street any longer.
• Regime Response- The state of emergency has been lifted, but protests are still not being tolerated. The mass arrests of human rights activists and political opponents have made it impossible for the opposition to organize large protests. There continues to be acts of retribution, such as the expelling of student protesters from their universities.
• Stability Level- High (previous month: high).
• Dependencies- Iranian intervention is the biggest dependency at the moment. There is no sign of a decisive split within the security services, so a crackdown is likely to again be successful if mass protests are put together. The situation will dramatically change if the Iranian regime chooses to covertly or overtly arm radical Shiite elements with the objective of fomenting a violent challenge to the Royal Family.

Egypt

• Status- The secular liberal forces in Egypt are becoming more vocal about their concerns regarding the planned parliamentary elections in September. The Muslim Brotherhood and elements of the former Mubarak regime have had much longer to organize for political competition. The secular liberal forces are making the case that a constitution should be written before elections are held, and the Islamists are taking the opposite position, saying such a change would be undemocratic. This is the primary debate in Egypt right now.
• Regime Response- The Egyptian Prime Minister sounds favorable to the pleas of the secularists, conceding that a delay would allow for a more competitive election and would be fairer to newer parties. However, the ruling military council is said to be opposed to a delay.
• Stability Level- Moderate (previous month: Moderate). The military stopped the largest riots since Mubarak’s fall in late June, and protests remain common.
• Dependencies- The ruling military council’s concerns over Islamist victories at the polls versus its desire to transfer to an elected government. The council could delay elections or refuse to recognize the election results if it feels the Islamists will become too powerful, but either move will result in a steep loss of popular support. A key factor will be the limits of the council’s tolerance for an Islamist role in the next government.

Iran

• Status- The Iranian regime’s primary concern is the fighting within its own institutions, specifically the struggle between the presidency and parliament and the presidency and the Supreme Leader. Aides close to Ahmadinejad have been dubbed “The Deviants” by opponents for their comparisons of Khamenei and Ahmadinejad to characters in Islamic prophecy. The latest blow to Ahmadinejad was the arrest of the deputy foreign minister, which Ahmadinejad denounced.
• Regime Response- The growing number of parliamentarians seeking Ahmadinejad’s impeachment is leading to rumors that Ayatollah Khamenei will soon demand his resignation.
• Stability Level- High (previous month: High). The political atmosphere is intense, but this has not resulted in major protests, clashes between security forces, or other problems that threaten the regime as a whole.
• Dependencies- The key dependency is whether Ayatollah Khamenei determines that dismissing Ahmadinejad will strengthen or weaken his own position. On the one hand, this could strengthen the regime by getting rid of a division. However, it may earn Khamenei more enemies than friends. Ahmadinejad’s supporters will become infuriated, and those who have turned against Khamenei for human rights abuses and standing by Ahmadinejad may not quickly embrace him again. Furthermore, there are the questions of what to do if Ahmadinejad refuses to resign and what danger he poses to the regime if he’s out of office.

Libya

• Status- The rebels have broken the stalemate, and are now advancing the mountainous areas in the western part of the country. The French have delivered arms to the rebels, and NATO is intensifying the air campaign. The arrest warrant issued for Qaddafi, his son and his intelligence chief will give him greater incentive to fight until the end.
• Regime Response- Qaddafi is vowing to never give up power, and there is no evidence that this public pledge is insincere.
• Stability Level- Low (previous month: Low).
• Dependencies- The affect that the rebel victories will have on the morale of the Qaddafi loyalists. The rebel advances are important but not decisive. The battlefield will become much more difficult for the rebels as they get closer to Tripoli and Sirte. The regime’s forces remember how they successfully held onto this area, and ultimately pushed the rebels back to Benghazi before foreign forces intervened. If the regime’s forces can be persuaded that this time is different, they will be more inclined to disarm or perhaps even join the opposition. It also makes it more likely that someone close to Qaddafi and his son will assassinate or arrest them.

Morocco

• Status- There were large protests in reaction to the King’s proposed constitutional reforms. The opposition does not feel they go far enough, though they do put limits on his power. On July 1, the country is voting on the reforms, and this will provide a strong indication of the King’s support and how well he has managed to appease his people.
• Regime Response- The Moroccan government has banned protests and used violence at times, but has also been quick to react to public demands with concessions. Unlike other leaders, King Mohammed VI is not being asked to resign by his population. The demand is for sweeping reform, not regime change.
• Stability Level- Moderate (previous month: moderate). The aftermath of the vote on the constitutional reforms will be the most important period for Morocco since the protests began. It is possible that the opposition will be divided. Some will vote in favor of the reforms even if they had wished for more, and others will be more concerned with giving the false impression that they are satisfied. It is also possible that this disagreement will be solved after the vote, and there will be a renewed commitment to force the government into implementing further reforms.
• Dependencies- The outcome of the vote on the reforms, and the limits of the government’s tolerance for mass protests. The government is playing a difficult balancing act. Repression could escalate the opposition’s demands and popular support, but a lack of force could result in the same. King Mohammed VI will have to decide whether a crackdown will increase stability, as was the case in Bahrain, or whether it’ll cause a greater backlash, like in Yemen.

Palestinian Territories

• Status- Fatah and Hamas have agreed to delay the formation of a unity government until after the U.N. votes on recognizing an independent Palestinian state. This reflects the deep divisions separating the two parties, and how premature it was to hail the reconciliation agreement between them. Hamas has been tied to efforts to send another flotilla to challenge the Israeli blockade of the Gaza Strip. This is an effort to ratchet up pressure on Israel as the Palestinians begin building support in the U.N. for recognition of a state based on the 1967 borders, as well as to alleviate pressure on Syria, Iran and Hezbollah.
• Stability Level- Moderate. There are no major protests or clashes, but the Palestinian Territories are on edge. There are several factors making a crisis increasingly likely: The second Gaza flotilla; the U.N. indictments of Hezbollah; the divisions within the Iranian regime; the ongoing revolution in Syria; and the Palestinians’ push for a U.N. vote on statehood.
• Dependencies- There are three key dependencies in the coming weeks: How Israel handles the Gaza flotilla (and the reaction of Hamas to that handling); Hezbollah’s reaction to the U.N. indictments; and the lengths to which the Iranian-Syrian bloc is willing to go to provoke Israel.

Saudi Arabia

• Status- The big issue in Saudi Arabia this month was the debate over allowing women to drive, sparked by the arrest of a woman who videotaped herself doing just that. Several other arrests have followed, inspired by her act of defiance. However, protests planned against the ban on women driving around the country fell flat. There are still consistent protests in the Shiite-majority Eastern Province, but the rest of the country is quiet.
• Regime Response- The Royal Family has given no sign of budging on the issue of women driving, and continues to arrest those that violate the law. The issue is receiving worldwide attention now and is a top issue in Saudi Arabia. It has the potential cause major upheaval as it pits religious conservatives against the reform-minded youth and makes it difficult for the Royal Family to appease both sides. Luckily for the Royal Family, nationwide protests did not happen and it can delay the day when it must pick a side.
• Stability Level- High (previous month: high).
• Dependencies- The ability of the Saudi Royal Family to pursue an agenda of reform to satisfy the liberal youth without antagonizing the Wahhabist religious establishment and causing a division within its own ranks. This is a balancing act that will become increasingly difficult to play. The Saudi youth are eager for reform, but the extremist clerics are just as eager to inhibit it.

Sudan

• Status- On July 9, South Sudan will officially become independent. It is unclear how the Sudanese regime of Omar Bashir will respond. His forces recently took over the oil-rich Abyei region that his regime wants to keep, and his regime is being accused of ethnic cleansing in the area. The two sides have agreed to a demilitarized zone on the border once secession happens, but the nature of the Bashir regime makes the future unpredictable.
• Regime Response- Bashir has promised to turn his country into a state fully based on Sharia Law, and has issued numerous threats towards the South. It is very possible that border clashes will escalate in the aftermath of the secession. Bashir says he will allow the South to be independent, but it is unlikely he’ll allow it to be stable.
• Stability Level- Low (previous month: low).
• Dependencies- Bashir’s assessment of whether he can allow South Sudan to be stable and successful will decide his decision-making. He may calculate that force is the best way to get South Sudan to offer his regime more oil revenue, whether that means shutting down pipelines, waging war or fomenting instability through proxies.

Syria

• Status- Over 1,500 civilians have been killed since the uprising began and over 11,000 have fled to Turkey. The Syrian military is brutally suppressing border towns that have become the scene of discontent, cutting off sources of food and medicine to refugees. A growing number of soldiers and policemen have been killed for refusing to fire upon civilians, and many are defecting. There have been clashes between security forces, but there has yet to be the kind of division that is necessary for a civil war.
• Regime Response- The regime is exercising exceptional brutality in its attempts to put down the uprising, creating a humanitarian crisis along the Turkish border. President Assad has given a speech promising sweeping reform, including allowing political parties besides his Baath Party to compete in parliamentary elections. His address was met with widespread protest, as the population simply does not trust his word and the opposition is demanding his immediate resignation. The regime continues to blame the bulk of the violence on gangs and Islamist terrorists.
• Stability Level- Low (previous month: low).
• Dependencies- Turkish intervention. If Turkey establishes a buffer zone, it will provide a place for Syrian military forces to defect and potentially, a safe haven for the opposition to organize with. This will depend upon whether Turkey decides to expand its goal from containing a refugee crisis to assisting the opposition achieve regime change. If Turkey decides to pursue the latter objective, it will have to decide what it will permit. The Turks are likely to allow the opposition to come together within a buffer zone and assist protests. It remains to be seen how the Turks would react to more aggressive measures, such as the creation of rebel military forces, within a zone under its control.

Yemen

• Status- President Saleh is currently in Saudi Arabia being treated for wounds he received from an assassination attempt. Until recently, government officials were adamant that he would return. Now, the Vice President is saying it could be months before Saleh comes back, and a Saudi official has been quoted as saying that he will not return. It is now likely that that Saleh’s rule is over.
• Stability Level- Low (previous month: low). There continues to be large protests, and the opposition is vowing to prevent Saleh’s return. Hundreds of soldiers, including about 100 from the Republican Guard, have recently defected, as well. At the same time, Al-Qaeda is advancing and battling the military forces in Abyan Province.
• Dependencies- The opposition is calling on the Vice President to form a transitional council. He is in a position to act without Saleh’s authority, but it is unclear if he is willing to do so. A key dependency will be whether the Vice President is comfortable asserting himself, or whether he will continue to act subservient to Saleh despite the fact he is currently in Saudi Arabia.

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Regional Analysis

The biggest shift in the balance of power was Turkey’s decision to side with the protesters in Syria and confront the Assad regime, a policy stance that puts it at odds with Iran, as well. Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan’s government had brought the country much closer to Iran and Syria, was increasingly hostile to Israel, and played an obstructionist role towards Western policy in the region. The increasing ties between Turkey, Iran and Syria presented a monumental challenge to the West, as the three together would have been the most powerful bloc in the Middle East.

The breaking of the relationship between Turkey and Syria is a welcomed development by the West. The Turkish IHH organization that was behind the first Gaza flotilla announced it would not participate in the second flotilla, citing “technical reasons.” Turkey’s decision to not provoke Israel is a very important development, and shows an effort to move back closer to the West.

Turkey is becoming more assertive as a regional power, and is eager to accept responsibilities as such. When Prime Minister Erdogan’s party won a landslide victory last month, he described it as a victory for the countries in the region, as well. Turkey wants to be treated as the dominant power, putting it in competition with Iran. The Turkish confrontation with Syria reflects this goal, and stands in sharp contrast to Turkey’s stance in the region before the Arab Spring began.

The Arab Spring made progress in Libya and Yemen this month, with the Libyan rebels advancing in the west and President Saleh being forced to go to Saudi Arabia for treatment after a dramatic assassination attempt. These are positive developments for the movements fighting for change in the region, as concern was growing that the Arab Spring had peaked. The opposition movements will take a note that these gains were made with violence, and were not entirely peaceful as was the case in Tunisia and Egypt. If the regimes are successfully changed in Libya and Yemen through violence, it could legitimize the use of violence in other countries. Military coups and civil wars may be seen as the only way to effect change if mass protests are not successful in the near-term.

The U.K. has accused Iran of carrying out secret tests of nuclear-capable missiles in violation of a U.N. resolution. The Iranian regime has also said it will triple the amount of enriched uranium it produces, and the International Atomic Energy Agency is saying it has acquired evidence of a “military dimension” to Iran’s nuclear program. The IAEA has also concluded that Syria was constructing a covert nuclear reactor until it was destroyed by Israel in September 2007. These accusations will increase international pressure on Iran and Syria, and will give the West momentum to pursue sanctions through the United Nations. The U.S. and European Union have also been sanctioning more and more Syrian and Iranian officials for human rights abuses.

The revelations about Iran’s nuclear advances have regional ramifications. A member of the Saudi Royal Family, Prince Turki al-Faisal, bluntly said in June that Saudi Arabia will begin developing nuclear weapons if Iran is not stopped. Saudi officials have also talked of increasing oil exports in order to destabilize the Iranian regime, which is heavily dependent upon revenue from oil sales. This change in rhetoric and publicly-issued threats show that Saudi Arabia and the Arab states are becoming more concerned about Iran. The question is how long it will take for these fears to result in dramatic changes in policy, such as the building of nuclear weapons or massive support to anti-regime elements within Iran.

A significant change has also happened in Egypt, where the secular forces are calling for the drafting of a constitution before holding parliamentary elections. This would almost certainly result in a delay of the vote that is set for September. The objective is to give the secular forces more time to organize, as their Islamist competitors have had a long head-start by organizing in mosques and Islamic centers. Their argument that the playing field is not fair is valid, but the Islamists are accusing the liberals of violating the will of the people as expressed in the referendum on the constitutional amendments that paved the way for elections.

This debate reflects a more advanced stage in Egypt’s political process where the opposition parties begin campaigning against one another. The outcome will influence the Arab Spring, as every aspiring politician and political party seeks to learn the lessons of the Egyptian campaigns. If the election is not delayed, the results will determine how the secular liberals and the Islamists in other countries will negotiate election dates in the future. If the election is delayed, the impact on public opinion will determine whether secular liberals take up such a cause in the future. If the Islamists are successful in characterizing the secularists as violating democratic principles, this will dissuade like-minded political forces from pushing for later election dates in the future. The debate over when to hold Egypt’s elections is a decisive discussion with regional repercussions.

In summary, there were several developments in June that affect the strategic equation. Turkey’s new, more interventionist role in the region is a positive development for the West in the short-term, but will raise concerns about neo-Ottomanism. Syria, Iran and Hezbollah are under increasing domestic and international pressure, and additional sanctions against them are certain. The likely success of the revolution in Yemen, thanks to an assassination attempt on President Saleh, may convince opposition movements that some degree of violence is permissible and necessary to break stalemates. And finally, the debate over the date for parliamentary elections in Egypt provides a foreshadowing of the future struggles in other countries where regimes are successfully replaced.

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Regional Outlook

Turkey’s confrontation with Syria and competition with Iran are advantageous to the West. However, it must be remembered that the Turkish government is Islamist in nature. It is very possible that Turkey will leverage its influence over the Syrian opposition to benefit the Muslim Brotherhood. This potentiality represents the dilemma facing the West. Turkey can serve as a powerful ally, but it can also promote the Islamist ideology of the Erdogan government. The success of Turkey will provide a boost to Islamism by providing an attractive model where modernity and economic success is combined with Islamist governance.

The outlook for Syria is grim. There are growing defections from the military, but they are far from the kinds of splits that have happened in Libya and Yemen. The regime is so far undeterred by Turkey’s threats, and is still brutally suppressing the opposition movement. Neither the regime nor the opposition movement is willing to concede ground and a stalemate has been reached. However, Turkish intervention or the assembling of defected soldiers into rebel units would change that.

The outlook for Yemen is also grim. It seems likely that Saleh will not return to Yemen and a transitional process will move forward. The future is unclear, but anti-Western elements are strong. The dominant opposition political party is Islah, which is an affiliate of the Muslim Brotherhood and is backed by the Salafists. In the south, there is a secessionist movement and Al-Qaeda is seeking to claim territory. In the north, the Iranian-backed Houthi rebels have long wanted autonomy, if not independence. It will be very difficult for the country to be held together in the post-Saleh era, and it is possible that the central government’s reach will be limited to the capital.

Libya’s future appears brighter now that the rebels are advancing. Italy’s call for a ceasefire is a setback for NATO, but it is hard to see how Qaddafi can remain in power over the long term. The International Criminal Court prosecutor who issued the arrest warrant for Qaddafi says he could fall within two to three months. The best hope for Qaddafi is that the international community abandons the rebels. The American public has grown war-weary and some participants in the coalition are seeking a way out, but it remains unlikely that such abandonment will occur. The rebels are slowly getting stronger and eventually, should prevail.

One other trend to watch for in the coming months is the movement for women’s rights in Saudi Arabia. The Royal Family has successfully prevented the Arab Spring from surfacing in a major way on the streets, but the youth are Westernized and seeking reform. Women’s rights, especially the right to drive, are very popular among the younger generation. However, the Wahhabist clerics are adamantly opposed to reform. The Saudi Royal Family is caught in a tug-of-war, and must carefully engage in limited reform while not offending the religious establishment too much. Beneath the surface, there is a major ideological struggle within Saudi Arabia and it is only a matter of time before it becomes visible.

Overall, the region is headed towards greater instability, but this instability will ironically lead to greater stability over the long-term. Wikistrat believes that globalization will create more open, democratic societies in the region that are more welcoming to Western influence and investment. However, there will be a fight by forces resistant to this fast-moving change, such as tyrannical governments and Islamist forces, and this will be the clash that defines the region over the short- and medium- term. The survival of the Islamist forces will depend upon their ability to cope with modernization and globalization, and how successfully their agenda as the conservation of Islamic principles while adapting to the 21st century.

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